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A FAILURE OF EXPRESSION: HOW THE PROVISIONS
OF THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY CODE FAIL TO ABROGATE
TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Greggory W. Dalton
Abstract: Sections 106(a) and 101(27) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code use the general
phrase "other foreign or domestic government" to abrogate sovereign immunity without
specifically referencing Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet decided whether
these sections of the Code abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, and lower court decisions
have come to varying conclusions. As a general rule, Indian tribes are immune from suit due
to their inherent sovereignty. Congress, however, may abrogate the sovereign immunity of
tribes by unequivocally stating its intent to do so in a statute. When interpreting abrogation
provisions in a statute, courts have only found an unequivocal expression to be present when
the statute explicitly references Indian tribes. The unequivocal expression standard used by
courts in determining the abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity is also used in the context
of state sovereign immunity and courts consider state sovereign immunity cases to be
persuasive authority when addressing tribal sovereign immunity. In the state context, the U.S.
Supreme Court has found general phrases in abrogation provisions to be insufficient to
satisfy the standard. This Comment argues that the U.S. Supreme Court must find that §§
106(a) and 101(27) of the Bankruptcy Code do not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. The
Bankruptcy Code contains no specific reference to Indian tribes. Moreover, courts have
found general phrases such as the one in the Bankruptcy Code insufficient to abrogate the
sovereign immunity of states. While the general phrase "other foreign or domestic
government" logically seems to encompass Indian tribes, such an inference is insufficient to
meet the unequivocal expression standard.
American Indian tribes are endowed with inherent sovereign power
and, accordingly, have historically possessed a common-law immunity
from suit.' Congress has the power to abrogate the sovereign immunity
of tribes but may do so only where it unequivocally expresses an intent
2to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity on the face of a statute.
Traditionally, when interpreting abrogation provisions in a statute, courts
have only found the statute to meet the unequivocal expression standard
1. See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game of State of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1977);
Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 357-58 (1919).
2. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (citing United States v. Testan, 424
U.S. 392, 399 (1976)); see also Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998)
(stating that Congress can only alter the limits of tribal immunity through "explicit legislation").
Additionally, congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity must be clearly expressed
in, and not implied from, the language of a statute. See Ute Distribution Corp. v. Ute Indian Tribe,
149 F.3d 1260, 1265-66 (10th Cir. 1998).
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when it explicitly references Indian tribes.3 As a result, statutes that fail
to reference tribes in either a direct statement of abrogation or a relevant
statutory subsection do not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.4
Courts also use an unequivocal expression standard in the context of
state sovereign immunity.5 Because the same standard applies in both
settings, courts have deemed precedent in the state context to be
persuasive in construing the abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity.
6
The U.S. Supreme Court has found general phrases in abrogation
provisions to be insufficient to abrogate state sovereign immunity.7 To
"unequivocally express" congressional intent to abrogate the immunity
of states, the Court requires statutes to specifically authorize suits
against states.
8
Sections 106(a) and 101(27) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code use the
general phrase "other foreign or domestic government" to identify those
entities subject to suit without explicitly referencing Indian tribes.9 The
U.S. Supreme Court has not yet decided whether these sections abrogate
tribal sovereign immunity,'0 and lower courts addressing the issue have
reached varying conclusions." For example, bankruptcy courts have
3. See Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 357 (2d Cir. 2000); Fla. Paraplegic
Ass'n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126, 1132-33 (1 1th Cir. 1999). But
see Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Russell, 293
B.R. 34, 41 (D. Ariz. 2003); In re Vianese, 195 B.R. 572, 576 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995).
4. See Bassett, 204 F.3d at 357; Fla. Paraplegic, 166 F.3d at 1132-33.
5. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996).
6. See Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1057; see also Osage Tribal Council v. U.S. Dep't of
Labor, 187 F.3d 1174, 1181 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing precedent on state sovereign immunity as
support for determining the sufficiency of a congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity).
7. See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (finding the phrase "every
person" to be insufficient to abrogate state sovereign immunity); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 245-46 (1985) (finding the phrase "any recipient of Federal assistance" to be
insufficient to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
8. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246.
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2000) ("Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity,
sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth in this
section .... ); II U.S.C. § 101(27) (2000) (defining "governmental unit" as "United States; State;
Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; department, agency, or
instrumentality of the United States[,] a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a
municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic government").
10. Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543
U.S. 871 (2004).
11. See generally Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1059; In re Mayes, 294 B.R. 145 (B.A.P. 10th
Cir. 2003); In re Nat'l Cattle Cong., 247 BR. 259 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000).
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held that because Indian tribes are not specifically named in the
Bankruptcy Code, a court would have to infer that Congress intended the
phrase "other foreign or domestic government" to encompass tribes, and
such an inference is inappropriate. 12 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
however, found this general phrase to encompass Indian tribes because a
previous U.S. Supreme Court case referred to tribes as "domestic
dependent nations.' 3
This Comment argues that §§ 106(a) and 101(27) of the Bankruptcy
Code do not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. Courts traditionally do
not allow Congress to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity using only a
general phrase in a statute in the absence of a specific reference to Indian
tribes.' 4 Moreover, general phrases have been deemed insufficient to
abrogate state sovereign immunity under the unequivocal expression
standard-the same standard applicable to the abrogation of tribal
sovereign immunity.' 5 Part I discusses how Congress may abrogate the
sovereign immunity of Indian tribes by unequivocally stating in a statute
its intent to do so. Part II describes how courts use the same standard in
determining the abrogation of both tribal and state sovereign immunity.
Part III explains how the U.S. Supreme Court has found general phrases
to be insufficient to demonstrate the requisite congressional intent for
abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Part IV introduces the
abrogation provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and summarizes the lower
court decisions on whether §§ 106(a) and 101(27) successfully abrogate
tribal sovereign immunity. Finally, Part V argues that the Bankruptcy
Code does not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity because the general
phrase "other foreign or domestic government" fails to constitute an
unequivocal expression of congressional intent.
12. See, e.g., In re Mayes, 294 B.R. at 148-49 n.10 (holding that § 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
fails to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity); In re Nat'l Cattle Cong., 247 B.R. at 267 (holding that
because the Bankruptcy Code makes no mention of Indian tribes in the abrogation provisions,
Indian tribes are not subject to suit under the statute).
13. See Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1057-59.
14. See id. (finding that there is "no other statute in which Congress effected a generic abrogation
of sovereign immunity").
15. See generally Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (finding the phrase
"every person" insufficient to abrogate state sovereign immunity); Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 245-46 (1985) (finding the phrase "any recipient of Federal assistance"
insufficient to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
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I. CONGRESS MUST UNEQUIVOCALLY EXPRESS ITS
INTENT TO ABROGATE TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Indian tribes, as independent sovereign entities, enjoy sovereign
immunity from suit. 16 Tribal sovereign immunity, however, is not
absolute. 17 Indian tribes are subject to suit when Congress unequivocally
expresses its intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in a statute. 18
Congressional intent to abrogate immunity must be clearly expressed in,
and not implied from, the face of the statute. 19 Courts have only found
statutes to meet this standard when the abrogation provisions explicitly
reference Indian tribes.20 As such, tribal sovereign immunity has been
found to be successfully abrogated when statutes specifically reference
tribes in either direct statements of abrogation or other statutory
subsections.21
A. Indian Tribes Possess Sovereign Immunity
Courts have historically deemed Indian tribes to possess a common-
law immunity from suit.22 This immunity is not a right explicitly granted
by treaty or statute, but rather is an inherent natural right of all sovereign
16. United States v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940).
17. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509
(1991).
18. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (citing United States v. Testan,
424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)); see also Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759
(1998) (stating that Congress can only alter the limits of tribal immunity through "explicit
legislation").
19. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58; Ute Distribution Corp. v. Ute Indian Tribe, 149 F.3d 1260,
1265-66 (10th Cir. 1998).
20. See, e.g., Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 357 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding
that Congress did not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-
1332 (2000), because the statute did not specifically reference tribes or suits against tribes); Fla.
Paraplegic Ass'n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126, 1132-33 (11th Cir.
1999) (holding that Congress did not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000), because the statute did not specifically
reference tribes or suits against tribes).
21. See Osage Tribal Council v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 187 F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir. 1999); Blue
Legs v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1095 (8th Cir. 1989).
22. See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game of State of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1977);
United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940); Turner v. United States, 248 U.S.
354, 357-58 (1919).
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entities that has never been stripped from the tribes.23 Thus, as a general
rule, Indian tribes are immune from suit.
2 4
B. To Subject Indian Tribes to Suit, Congress Must Unequivocally
Express Its Intent to Abrogate Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Although tribal sovereign immunity is not absolute, 25 Congress may
not subject Indian tribes to suit unless it unequivocally expresses an
intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. 6 The U.S. Constitution
grants Congress the power to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.27 To
do so, however, Congress must unequivocally express its intent to
subject tribes to suit in the language of a statute.28 Accordingly,
abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity will not be found if the court
must infer congressional intent from the language of a statute.29
Moreover, courts readily adhere to the general principle that statutes are
to be interpreted to the benefit of Indian tribes.3° When the language of a
statute is ambiguous, its provisions are liberally construed against
abrogation and in favor of maintaining tribal sovereign immunity.
31
23. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978).
24. See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. at 512.
25. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509
(1991).
26. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (citing United States v. Testan,
424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)); see also Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759
(1998) (stating that Congress can only alter the limits of tribal immunity through "explicit
legislation").
27. The U.S. Constitution provides Congress with the authority "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations ... and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. As such, Congress has
the plenary authority to "limit, modify or eliminate" tribal sovereign immunity. Martinez, 436 U.S.
at 56. Congress has done so by "occasionally authoriz[ing] limited classes of suits against Indian
tribes." Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 510; see also Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 758 (stating that Congress
has "restricted tribal immunity from suit in limited circumstances").
28. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58 (finding that congressional intent to subject tribes to suit must be
clearly expressed in, and not implied from, the face of a statute). In reaching this conclusion, Justice
Marshall explained that "a proper respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary
authority of Congress in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of
legislative intent." Id. at 60.
29. See id. at 58-59; accord Ute Distribution Corp. v. Ute Indian Tribe, 149 F.3d 1260, 1265-66
(10th Cir. 1998) (holding that abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity will not be found if the court
must "glean some congressional intent to [abrogate] immunity based on an examination of the
structure or purpose of the statute").
30. See, e.g., Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985); McClanahan v.
Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912).
31. See Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. at 766.
649
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Whenever any uncertainty exists in a statute, federal deference is granted
to maintain the sovereignty of Indian tribes.32 Therefore, unless there is
an unequivocal expression of legislative intent to the contrary, suits
against Indian tribes are barred.3 3
C. To Successfully Abrogate Tribal Sovereign Immunity, Congress
Must Evidence Its Unequivocal Intent to Subject Tribes to Suit by
Explicitly Referencing Indian Tribes
Courts only find Congress to have unequivocally expressed its intent
to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity when Indian tribes are specifically
referenced in the relevant provisions of a statute.34 Conversely, in the
absence of such a specific reference to tribes, courts have found statutes
to lack the unmistakably clear indication of congressional intent
necessary to successfully abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. 35 For
instance, in Florida Paraplegic Ass'n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians of Florida,36 the Eleventh Circuit considered whether Congress,
in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),37 had abrogated tribal
sovereign immunity.38 The ADA provides civil remedies for acts of
discrimination in public accommodations, but does not specifically
provide for suits against Indian tribes. 39 Reasoning that Congress always
32. See id.
33. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58.
34. See, e.g., Osage Tribal Council, 187 F.3d at 1181-82 (holding that the language of the Safe
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (2000), clearly abrogates tribal immunity by
defining a "person" subject to suit to include a "municipality," which in turn is defined to include
"an Indian tribe"); United States v. Weddell, 12 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1000 (D.S.D. 1998) (finding that
the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3308 (2000), unequivocally
expresses the abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity by defining a "person" subject to suit to
include "an Indian tribe"); Blue Legs v. EPA, 668 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (D.S.D. 1987) (holding that
the definitions and provisions for citizen suits under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (2000), indicate congressional intent to subject tribes to suit).
35. See, e.g., Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 357 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding
that Congress failed to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in the Copyright Act because the statute
did not specifically reference tribes or suits against tribes); Fla. Paraplegic Ass'n, Inc. v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126, 1132-33 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that
Congress failed to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in the ADA because the statute did not
specifically reference tribes or suits against tribes).
36. 166 F.3d 1126 (llth Cir. 1999).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
38. See id. at 1131-32.
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (2000) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (2000) (providing that "a
civil action for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction,
restraining order, or other order, may be instituted by the person aggrieved")); 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)
Vol. 81:645, 2006
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"address[es] Indian tribes specifically and individually" when abrogating
tribal sovereign immunity,40 the court held that because the ADA lacks
such an express reference, it fails to abrogate the immunity of tribes.41
Moreover, by applying standard methods of statutory construction,42 the
Eleventh Circuit found that because the ADA abrogated state sovereign
immunity by specifically referencing states, the absence of any
equivalent reference to Indian tribes weighed heavily against finding the
statute to successfully abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.43
The Second Circuit has also found statutes to lack an unequivocal
expression of congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity
in the absence of a specific reference to tribes.44 In Bassett v.
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe,45 the Second Circuit considered whether
Congress, in the Copyright Act,46 had abrogated tribal sovereign
immunity.47 Congress has granted the federal courts subject matter
jurisdiction over civil actions arising from violations of the Copyright
Act,48 but has not expressly authorized suits against tribes.49 Finding that
nothing in the language of the Copyright Act "purports to subject tribes
to ... civil actions, '5 ° the court of appeals held that the statute fails to
(2000) (defining "[p]ublic accommodation" to include twelve expansive categories, each of which
lists specific establishments); Fla. Paraplegic, 166 F.3d at 1132-34.
40. Fla. Paraplegic, 166 F.3d at 1132.
41. See id. at 1132-34 (stating that the absence of any reference to tribes was "a stark omission of
any attempt by Congress to declare tribes subject to private suit").
42. See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980) (finding that "[w]here
Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are
not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent").
43. See Fla. Paraplegic, 166 F.3d at 1130-33 (finding the reference to states in the abrogation
provisions of the ADA to demonstrate Congress's understanding of the need to specifically mention
both states and tribes in a statute in order to abrogate their immunities); see also In re Greene, 980
F.2d 590, 594 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that "Congress knows how to limit the sovereign
immunity of others when it wants to").
44. See Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 356-59 (2d Cir. 2000).
45. 204 F.3d 343 (2d Cir. 2000).
46. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000).
47. See id. at 356-59.
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000) (providing for federal jurisdiction over "any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and
trademarks").
49. See Bassett, 204 F.3d at 357.
50. Id. (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978)).
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abrogate tribal sovereign immunity because it lacks any specific
reference to tribes. 5'
D. Congress May Meet the Unequivocal Expression Standard by
Referencing Tribes in Either Direct Statements or Definitions of
Entities Subject to Suit
While case law does not precisely define the term "unequivocal
expression, 5 2 courts have found the standard to be met when statutes
either directly abrogate tribal sovereign immunity or indirectly do so by
including tribes within the definition of entities subject to suit. 53 In a
number of statutes, Congress has directly stated its intent to abrogate
tribal sovereign immunity.54 Courts have found such statements to
constitute an unequivocal expression of congressional intent. 5
Courts have also found abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity when
Congress has expressed its intent by including Indian tribes in the
definitions of parties who may be sued under a statute. 6 For example, in
Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs,57 the Eighth Circuit
51. See id. at 356-58.
52. See Osage Tribal Council v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 187 F.3d 1174, 1181 (10th Cir. 1999).
53. See id. at 1181-82.
54. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 450f(c)(3) (2000) ("[an] insurance carrier shall waive any right it may
have to raise as a defense the sovereign immunity of an Indian tribe from suit"); 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (2000) ("The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over.., any
cause of action initiated by a State or Indian tribe to enjoin a class IIl gaming activity located on
Indian lands and conducted in violation of any Tribal-State compact entered into ....").
Additionally, in certain instances, Congress has expressly declared an intention not to abrogate
tribal sovereign immunity. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 450n (2000) ("Nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed as... affecting, modifying, diminishing, or otherwise impairing the sovereign immunity
from suit enjoyed by an Indian tribe ....").
55. See, e.g., Osage Tribal Council, 187 F.3d at 1182 (finding that Congress may abrogate the
sovereign immunity of tribes by including within a statute "a provision directly stating its intent to
[abrogate] tribal immunity"). While such direct statements effectively abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity, Congress need not declare its intent to abrogate within a single statutory section. See
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73-74 (2000).
56. See, e.g., Osage Tribal Council, 187 F.3d at 1181-82 (holding that the language of the Safe
Drinking Water Act clearly abrogates tribal immunity by defining a "person" subject to suit to
include a "municipality," which in turn is defined to include "an Indian tribe"); United States v.
Weddell, 12 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1000 (D.S.D. 1998) (finding that the Federal Debt Collection
Procedure Act unequivocally expresses the abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity by defining a
"person" subject to suit to include "an Indian tribe"); Blue Legs v. EPA, 668 F. Supp. 1329, 1337
(D.S.D. 1987) (holding that the definitions and provisions for citizen suits under RCRA indicate
congressional intent to subject tribes to suit).
57. 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989).
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considered whether Congress, in the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),58 abrogated tribal sovereign immunity.59
RCRA entitles citizens to bring compliance suits against "any person" in
violation of the statute.60 The definition of "person" under the statute
includes municipalities. 6' Furthermore, a municipality is defined to
include "an Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization." 62 By piecing
together the subsections of RCRA, the court found the statute to contain
the requisite congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity.
63
In sum, while tribal sovereign immunity is not absolute, Indian tribes
are only subject to suit if Congress unequivocally expresses its intent to
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity on the face of a statute. An
unequivocal expression may be found in either direct statements of
abrogation or references in statutory subsections. Regardless of where in
the statute the intent is expressed, courts have only found abrogation of
tribal sovereign immunity to be unmistakably clear when the statute
explicitly references Indian tribes.
II. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CASES ARE PERSUASIVE
IN THE CONTEXT OF TRIBAL SOVERERIGN IMMUNITY
Courts consider precedent on the abrogation of state sovereign
immunity to be persuasive authority in the context of tribal sovereign
immunity.64 Like Indian tribes, states possess sovereign immunity that
may be abrogated by a congressional act.65 To abrogate state sovereign
immunity, Congress must satisfy the same unequivocal expression
standard used by courts in determining the abrogation of tribal sovereign
immunity.66 Because courts use the same standard in determining the
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (2000).
59. See Blue Legs, 867 F.2d at 1095-98.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A) (2000).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (2000).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(13)(A) (2000).
63. See Blue Legs, 867 F.2d at 1095.
64. See Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004); see also
Osage Tribal Council v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 187 F.3d 1174, 1181 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing
precedent on state sovereign immunity as support for determining whether language is sufficient to
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity).
65. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996).
66. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55; see
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abrogation of state sovereign immunity, precedent in the state context is
persuasive in construing the abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity.67
III. GENERAL PHRASES DO NOT SATISFY THE
UNEQUIVOCAL EXPRESSION STANDARD
When Congress uses a general phrase to subject a broad class of
entities to suit, the use of such a phrase does not abrogate state sovereign
immunity, 68 even if the phrase logically seems to encompass states.
69
One illustrative case is Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.70 In
Atascadero, an unsuccessful applicant for a position with a state hospital
filed a complaint alleging that the hospital's refusal to hire him was due
to his physical disability and thus a violation of section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.71 On review, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
state hospital was immune from suit because the Rehabilitation Act fails
to abrogate state sovereign immunity.72 Section 505(a)(2) of the
Rehabilitation Act provides for remedies for violations of section 504 by
"any recipient of Federal assistance. ' 73 While states are unquestionably
recipients of federal assistance, the Court held that Congress had not
unequivocally expressed its intention to abrogate state sovereign
immunity.74 The Court declared that to abrogate state sovereign
immunity, Congress must specifically authorize suits against states.75
also Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (finding that Congress abrogates state sovereign
immunity only where it "unequivocally expresses its intent" to abrogate the immunity); Osage
Tribal Council, 187 F.3d at 1181 ("Conceding potential differences between tribal and state
sovereign immunity, we note that courts have often used similar language in defining the
requirements for [abrogation] of these immunities.").
67. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54; Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1056; see also Osage
Tribal Council, 187 F.3d at 1181 (citing precedent on state sovereign immunity as support for
determining whether language is sufficient to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity).
68. See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S, 58, 64 (1989) (finding the phrase
every person" to be insufficient to abrogate state sovereign immunity); Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 245-246 (1985) (finding the phrase "any recipient of Federal assistance" to
be insufficient to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
69. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230-32 (1989).
70. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 236.
72. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2).
74. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243-46.
75. See id. at 246.
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Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a statutory provision
that subjects "every person" to suit is insufficient to abrogate state
sovereign immunity. 76 In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,7 7
a state employee who was denied a promotion brought an action against
the Department of State Police for violating a federal civil rights
78statute. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the state was
immune from suit because by subjecting "every person" to suit, 79
Congress had not unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate state
sovereign immunity. While not disputing that a general term such as
"person" encompasses municipalities,81 the Court held that the term
"person" fell short of demonstrating the unequivocal expression standard
required to abrogate state sovereign immunity.82
The U.S. Supreme Court has even suggested that the general term
"[e]very common carrier by railroad" is an insufficient indication of
congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity.83 In Hilton v.
South Carolina Public Railways Commission,84 an employee of a state-
owned railroad brought an action in state court against the railroad under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA).85 Under FELA, Congress
used the phrase "[e]very common carrier by railroad" to describe the
type of employers subject to suit under the statute.86 Prior to Hilton, the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that FELA does not abrogate state
sovereign immunity because the phrase "[e]very common carrier by
railroad" fails to meet the unequivocal expression standard espoused in
Will.87 Nevertheless, in a decision made prior to Will, the U.S. Supreme
Court had found FELA to effectively abrogate state sovereign
76. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989).
77. 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
78. Id. at 60. The statute at issue in Will was 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), which provides: "[e]very
person who ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen.. . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." Will, 491 U.S. at 64-65.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
80. See Will, 491 U.S. at 64.
81. See Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
82. See Will, 491 U.S. at 65 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242
(1985) and Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
83. See Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 201-07 (1991).
84. 502 U.S. 197 (1991).
85. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000). See Hilton, 502 U.S. at 199.
86. See 45 U.S.C. § 51.
87. See Freeman v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 393 S.E.2d 383, 383-84 (S.C. 1990).
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88immunity. As a result of the prior decision, the Court, bound by stare
decisis, subjected the state-owned railroad to suit in Hilton.89 The Court
did not, however, find the phrase to constitute a clear statement of
congressional intent.90 In fact, the Court's exhaustive discussion of stare
decisis and its rationale for following the doctrine indicates that it
viewed the phrase as insufficient to satisfy the "unequivocal expression"
standard.91 Therefore, Hilton strongly suggests that but for the FELA
precedent established prior to Will, the general phrase "[e]very common
carrier by railroad" would be an insufficient indication of congressional
intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity.92
Moreover, the fact that a general phrase may logically seem to
encompass states does not alone demonstrate the requisite congressional
intent for abrogation of state sovereign immunity.9 3 In Dellmuth v.
Muth,94 the U.S. Supreme Court conceded that one could infer from the
language of the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) 95 that
Congress intended to subject states to suit.96 Nevertheless, the Court held
that such a "permissible inference" was insufficient to abrogate
sovereign immunity because the Court could not say with "perfect
confidence" that Congress intended to subject states to suit.97 Absent an
unequivocal declaration of congressional intent in the statute, the
"logical force" of the language is irrelevant.98 The Court stated that
abrogation of state sovereign immunity cannot be established by
inference, implication, or even legislative history.99 Only an unequivocal
expression on the face of the statute will be deemed sufficient. 100
88. See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1964)
(holding that FELA authorizes suits for damages against state-owned railroads).
89. See Hilton, 502 U.S. at 202.
90. See id. at 201-07.
91. See id.
92. See id.; Cf Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991) (finding it unclear whether the
generic and ambiguous phrase "appointee at the policymaking level" included judges, despite
acknowledging that judges were both appointees and policymakers).
93. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230-32 (1989).
94. 491 U.S. 223 (1989).
95. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2000).
96. See id. at 232.
97. See id. at 231-32.
98. See id. at 230-32.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 230.
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Because the Court concluded that the EHA lacked such an expression,
the statute failed to abrogate state sovereign immunity.'
01
IV. COURTS DISAGREE ON WHETHER THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE ABROGATES TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The abrogation provisions of the Bankruptcy Code refer only to
"other foreign or domestic government," with no explicit reference to
Indian tribes. 0 2 The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether
this general phrase is sufficient to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity,
10 3
and lower courts faced with interpreting the abrogation provisions have
come to varying conclusions. 0 4 Some bankruptcy courts have held that
since Indian tribes are not specifically included in the Bankruptcy Code,
a court would have to infer that Congress intended the phrase "domestic
government" to encompass tribes, and such an inference is
inappropriate.10 5 The Ninth Circuit, however, has found the general
phrase to be sufficient to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity because a
previous U.S. Supreme Court case referred to tribes as "domestic
dependent nations.' 0 6 In analyzing the Bankruptcy Code, neither the
bankruptcy courts nor the Ninth Circuit looked to analogous cases
addressing congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity. 10 7
101. See id. at 230-32.
102. See 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2000); 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (2000); supra note 9.
103. Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543
U.S. 871 (2004).
104. Compare Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1055 (holding that §§ 106(a) and 101(27) of the
Bankruptcy Code effectively evidence congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity),
with In re Mayes, 294 B.R. 145 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2003) (holding that § 106(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code fails to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity), and In re Nat'l Cattle Cong., 247 B.R. 259
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000) (holding that because the Bankruptcy Code makes no mention of Indian
tribes in the abrogation provisions, Indian tribes are not subject to suit under the statute).
105. See, e.g., In re Mayes, 294 B.R. at 148-49 n.10 (holding that § 106(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code fails to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity); In re Nat 'l Cattle Cong., 247 B.R. at 267
(holding that since the Bankruptcy Code makes no mention of Indian tribes in the abrogation
provisions, Indian tribes are not subject to suit under the statute).
106. See Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1057-59 (citing Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,
501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991).
107. See generally Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1055; In re Mayes, 294 B.R. at 145; In re
Nat'l Cattle Cong., 247 B.R. at 259.
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A. The Abrogation Provisions of the Bankruptcy Code Contain a
General Phrase and Do Not Specifically Reference Indian Tribes
In drafting the Bankruptcy Code, Congress chose to include a general
phrase in the abrogation provisions without explicitly referring to Indian
tribes. 0 8 Section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code abrogates the sovereign
immunity of "governmental unit[s]."'10 9 Section 101(27) of the Code
defines "governmental unit[s]" by including the general phrase "other
foreign or domestic government" at the end of a seemingly exhaustive
list of governmental entities. 10 While sovereign entities like states are
specifically listed in the abrogation provisions, no reference is made to
Indian tribes.'' Thus, to hold tribes subject to suit under the Bankruptcy
Code, a court must find the general phrase "other foreign or domestic
government" to be an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity."
12
B. Courts Have Reached Varying Conclusions as to Whether the
Bankruptcy Code Effectively Abrogates Tribal Sovereign Immunity
The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet determined whether the general
phrase "other foreign or domestic government" is sufficient to abrogate
tribal sovereign immunity.' 3 Courts faced with interpreting whether the
phrase constitutes an unequivocal expression of congressional intent
have come to varying conclusions. 14 For example, while bankruptcy
courts have found §§ 106(a) and 101(27) of the Bankruptcy Code
108. See 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2000); II U.S.C. § 101(27) (2000).
109. II U.S.C. § 106(a) ("Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign
immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit ... ").
110. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (defining "governmental unit" to include "United States; State;
Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; department, agency, or
instrumentality of the United States [,] a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a
municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic government"). It may be that Congress
intended to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity with the phrase "other foreign or domestic
government." This Congress cannot do. It must explicitly mention tribes in order to abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity, so its chosen language trumps this assumed intent. See Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)).
111. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27).
112. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58 (citing Testan, 424 U.S. at 399).
113. See Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 871 (2004).
114. See generally id.; In re Mayes, 294 B.R. 145 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2003); In re Nat'l Cattle
Cong., 247 B.R. 259 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000).
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insufficient to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity," 5 the Ninth Circuit
has found the provisions to effectively abrogate the immunity of
tribes.116
1. Bankruptcy Courts Have Held that the Bankruptcy Code Fails to
Abrogate Tribal Sovereign Immunity
When interpreting §§ 106(a) and 101(27) of the Bankruptcy Code,
bankruptcy courts have found the abrogation provisions not to represent
an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to abrogate the
sovereign immunity of tribes.' 7 For example, in In re National Cattle
Congress, 1 8 a debtor sought to confirm a Chapter 11 plan that proposed
to extinguish a real estate mortgage lien held by the Sac and Fox
Tribe.' 19 The Tribe argued that tribal sovereign immunity prevented the
court from negating the mortgage lien. 120 The bankruptcy court agreed,
finding that Congress had not abrogated tribal sovereign immunity under
the Bankruptcy Code.' 2' The court began its analysis by noting that
when Indian tribes are not specifically referenced in abrogation
provisions, courts have found the statutes not to unequivocally express
congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. 22 Therefore,
the court concluded that since the Bankruptcy Code makes no specific
mention of Indian tribes, a court would need to infer from the language
that Congress intended to subject tribes to suit. 23 The court deemed such
115. See, e.g., In re Mayes, 294 B.R. at 148-49 n.10 (holding that § 106(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code fails to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity); In re Nat'l Cattle Cong., 247 B.R. at 267
(holding that because the Bankruptcy Code makes no mention of Indian tribes in the abrogation
provisions, Indian tribes are not subject to suit under the statute).
116. See Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1057-59.
117. See, e.g., In re Mayes, 294 B.R. at 148-49 n.10 (holding that § 106(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code fails to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity); In re Nat'l Cattle Cong., 247 B.R. at 267
(holding that because the Bankruptcy Code makes no mention of Indian tribes in the abrogation
provisions, Indian tribes are not subject to suit under the statute).
118. 247 B.R. 259 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000).
119. See id. at 263.
120. See id. at 264.
121. Seeid. at 267.
122. See id. (citing Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 357-58 (2d Cir. 2000)
and Fla. Paraplegic Ass'n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126, 1131 (11 th
Cir. 1999)).
123. See id.
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an inference to be inappropriate and thus found the Tribe to be immune
from suit. 1
24
Similarly, in In re Mayes,125 a bankruptcy appellate panel held that the
term "other foreign or domestic government" in the Bankruptcy Code
does not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. 126 In In re Mayes, a debtor
filed a motion to avoid a judicial lien, claiming the judgment lien
secured by the Cherokee Nation against the debtor's homestead was
void.127 Finding the avoidance motion to constitute a "suit," the appellate
panel concluded that the Cherokee Nation was immune from suit
because the court did not consider the term "other foreign or domestic
government" to include Indian tribes. 128 The court found the general
phrase to be an insufficient indication of congressional intent to abrogate
tribal sovereign immunity.
1 29
2. The Ninth Circuit Has Found the Bankruptcy Code to
Unequivocally Express Congress's Intent to Abrogate Tribal
Sovereign Immunity
The Ninth Circuit has found §§ 106(a) and 101(27) of the Bankruptcy
Code to effectively evidence congressional intent to abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity. 130 In Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation,'13' a
debtor in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding was issued tax
assessments by the Office of the Navajo Tax Commission. 132 The debtor
appealed the assessments and filed an adversary proceeding against the
Navajo Nation.133 Both the bankruptcy court and the district court found
the Navajo Nation to be immune from suit, holding that §§ 106(a) and
101(27) do not unequivocally express congressional intent to abrogate
tribal sovereign immunity. 134 On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit
124. See id.; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); Ute Distribution
Corp. v. Ute Indian Tribe, 149 F.3d 1260, 1267-68 (10th Cir. 1998).
125. 294 B.R. 145 (B.A.P. 10th Cit. 2003).
126. See id. at 148-49 n.10.
127. See id. at 147.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 148-49 n.10.
130. See Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004).
131. 357 F.3d 1055 (9th Cit. 2004).
132. See id. at 1056.
133. See id.
134. See id.
660
Vol. 81:645, 2006
Failure of Expression
reversed, finding the same provisions in the Code sufficient to abrogate
tribal sovereign immunity.1 35 Specifically, the court found the general
phrase "other foreign or domestic governments" to encompass Indian
tribes because the U.S. Supreme Court had in a previous case referred to
tribes as "domestic dependent nations,"' 36 and ifi another case asserted
that tribes are more akin to states than foreign sovereigns. 37 On this
basis, the court concluded that in using the phrase "other foreign or
domestic government," Congress intended to abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity by "legislating against the back-drop of prior Supreme Court
decisions."1 38 As a result, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress had
unequivocally stated its intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity
without referencing Indian tribes. 1
39
In sum, the abrogation provisions of the Bankruptcy Code contain a
general phrase without explicitly referencing Indian tribes. The U.S.
Supreme Court has not yet determined whether the general phrase "other
foreign or domestic government" is sufficient to abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity, and lower courts addressing the issue have come to
varying conclusions. In analyzing the Bankruptcy Code, however,
neither the bankruptcy courts nor the Ninth Circuit looked to analogous
cases addressing congressional abrogation of state sovereign
immunity.
40
V. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE DOES NOT ABROGATE TRIBAL
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The Bankruptcy Code does not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity
because it fails to unequivocally express congressional intent to do So.14 1
135. See id. at 1057.
136. See id. (citing Okla. Tax Comm'n. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S.
505, 509 (1991)).
137. See id. at 1058 (citing Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991)).
138. See id. at 1059.
139. See id. at 1061; accord In re Russell, 293 B.R. 34, 41 (D. Ariz. 2003) ("[B]ecause [the
Bankruptcy Code] expressly abrogates sovereign immunity as to all domestic governments, the
statute applies to Indian tribes by deduction .... ); In re Vianese, 195 B.R. 572, 576 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Indian nations are considered 'domestic dependent nations' and as such comprise
'governmental units' within the meaning of Code § 101(27).").
140. See generally Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1055; In re Mayes, 294 B.R. 145 (B.A.P. 10th
Cir. 2003); In re Nat'l Cattle Congress, 247 BR. 259 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000).
141. Cf Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (citing United States v. Testan,
424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)) (finding that Congress must unequivocally express the intent to abrogate
tribal sovereign immunity in a statute in order to subject Indian tribes to suit).
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The Bankruptcy Code uses the general phrase "other foreign or domestic
government" in its abrogation provisions, but fails to specifically
reference Indian tribes. 142 Traditionally, whenever courts have found an
unequivocal expression of congressional intent to abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity, Indian tribes have always been explicitly listed in a
direct statement or statutory definition. 143 Moreover, precedent on the
abrogation of state sovereign immunity is persuasive in the context of
tribal sovereign immunity.1 44 Accordingly, because the U.S. Supreme
Court has found general phrases to be insufficient to abrogate state
sovereign immunity, the general phrase "other foreign or domestic
government" likewise fails to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.145 The
mere fact that the general phrase logically seems to encompass Indian
tribes does not suffice to meet the unequivocal expression standard.
146
A. The Bankruptcy Code Fails to Abrogate Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Because It Does Not Specifically Reference Indian Tribes
Sections 106(a) and 101(27) of the Bankruptcy Code are insufficient
to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity because the provisions never
specifically reference Indian tribes. 147 Whenever courts have found an
142. See 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2000); 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (2000).
143. See, e.g., Osage Tribal Council v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 187 F.3d 1174, 1181-82 (10th Cir.
1999) (holding that the language of the Safe Drinking Water Act clearly abrogates tribal immunity
by defining a "person" subject to suit to include a "municipality," which in turn is defined to include
"an Indian tribe"); United States v. Weddell, 12 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1000 (D.S.D. 1998) (finding that
the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act unequivocally expresses the abrogation of tribal
sovereign immunity by defining a "person" subject to suit to include "an Indian tribe"); Blue Legs
v. EPA, 668 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (D.S.D. 1987) (holding that the definitions and provisions for
citizen suits under RCRA indicate congressional intent to subject tribes to suit). See also Krystal
Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1059 (finding that there is "no other statute in which Congress effected a
generic abrogation of sovereign immunity").
144. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d
at 1056; see also Osage Tribal Council, 187 F.3d at 1181 (citing precedent on state sovereign
immunity as support for determining whether language is sufficient to abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity).
145. See generally Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (finding the phrase
"every person" to be insufficient to abrogate state sovereign immunity); Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 245-46 (1985) (finding the phrase "any recipient of Federal assistance" to
be insufficient to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
146. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230-32 (1989).
147. See 11 U.S.C. § 106(a); 11 U.S.C. § 101(27). Cf Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204
F.3d 343, 357 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that Congress failed to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in
the Copyright Act because the statute did not specifically reference tribes or suits against tribes);
Fla. Paraplegic Ass'n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126, 1132-33 (11 th
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unequivocal expression of congressional intent to abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity, Indian tribes have traditionally been explicitly
listed in a direct statement or a statutory definition. 148 Courts have
refused to find abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity in the absence of
a specific reference to tribes. 149 Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Code does
not unequivocally express congressional intent to abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity because the statute fails to specifically reference
Indian tribes in its abrogation provisions. 150 Instead, the Bankruptcy
Code abrogates the sovereign immunity of a "governmental unit"
without directly listing tribes in the definition of a "governmental
unit. 1
51
Moreover, while failing to list tribes, Congress did specifically list
states in the abrogation provisions. 152 By applying standard methods of
statutory construction,1 53 courts have found statutes that abrogate state
sovereign immunity by specifically referencing states to not abrogate
tribal sovereign immunity in the absence of an equivalent reference to
tribes. 154 Thus, the specific listing of states in the abrogation provisions
Cir. 1999) (holding that Congress failed to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in the ADA because
the statute does not specifically reference tribes or suits against tribes).
148. See, e.g., Osage Tribal Council, 187 F.3d at 1181-82 (holding that the language of the Safe
Drinking Water Act clearly abrogates tribal immunity by defining a "person" subject to suit to
include a "municipality," which in turn is defined to include "an Indian tribe"); United States v.
Weddell, 12 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1000 (D.S.D. 1998) (finding that the Federal Debt Collection
Procedure Act unequivocally expresses the abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity by defining a
"person" subject to suit to include "an Indian tribe"); Blue Legs v. EPA, 668 F. Supp. 1329, 1337
(D.S.D. 1987) (holding that the definitions and provisions for citizen suits under RCRA indicate
congressional intent to subject tribes to suit).
149. See, e.g., Bassett, 204 F.3d at 357 (finding that Congress failed to abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity in the Copyright Act because the statute did not specifically reference tribes or suits
against tribes); Fla. Paraplegic, 166 F.3d at 1132-33 (holding that Congress failed to abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity in the ADA because the statute does not specifically reference tribes or suits
against tribes).
150. See 11 U.S.C. § 106(a); 11 U.S.C. § 101(27). Cf. Will, 491 U.S. at 64 (finding the phrase
every person" to be insufficient to abrogate state sovereign immunity); Atascadero, 473 U.S. 245-
46 (finding the phrase "any recipient of Federal assistance" to be insufficient to abrogate state
sovereign immunity).
151. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27).
152. Id.
153. See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980) (finding that "[w]here
Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are
not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent").
154. See, e.g., Fla. Paraplegic, 166 F.3d at 1130-33 (finding the reference to states in the
abrogation provisions of the ADA to demonstrate Congress's understanding of the need to
specifically mention both states and tribes in a statute in order to abrogate their immunities); see
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of the Bankruptcy Code weighs heavily against finding that the statute
effectively abrogates tribal sovereign immunity. 155 Because courts have
only found an unequivocal expression of congressional intent when
statutes specifically reference Indian tribes, the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code are insufficient to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.
B. The Bankruptcy Code Fails to Abrogate Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Because General Phrases Do Not Satisfy the Unequivocal
Expression Standard
Sections 106(a) and 101(27) do not effectively abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity because the general phrase "other foreign or
domestic government" fails to demonstrate an unequivocal expression of
congressional intent to subject tribes to suit.1 56 Courts use the same
unequivocal expression standard to determine the abrogation of both
state and tribal sovereign immunity.1 57 As a result, precedent regarding
the use of general phrases in abrogating state sovereign immunity is
instructive and persuasive in construing the abrogation of tribal
sovereign immunity. 15 8 Nevertheless, in analyzing the Bankruptcy Code,
neither the bankruptcy courts nor the Ninth Circuit looked to analogous
cases addressing congressional abrogation of state sovereign
immunity. 15
9
In the state context, courts have found general phrases to be
insufficient to unequivocally express congressional intent to abrogate
state sovereign immunity. 160 Given this precedent, a general phrase like
also In re Greene, 980 F.2d 590, 594 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that "Congress knows how to limit
the sovereign immunity of others when it wants to").
155. See Fla. Paraplegic, 166 F.3d at 1130-33.
156. See 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2000); 11 U.S.C. § 101(27).
157. See Osage Tribal Council v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 187 F.3d 1174, 1181 (10th Cir. 1999)
("Conceding potential differences between tribal and state sovereign immunity, we note that courts
have often used similar language in defining the requirements for [abrogation] of these
immunities.").
158. See id. at 1181-82 (citing the context of state sovereign immunity as support for determining
whether language is sufficient to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity).
159. See generally Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2004); In re
Mayes, 294 B.R. 145 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2003); In re Nat'l Cattle Cong., 247 B.R. 259 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 2000).
160. See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (finding the phrase
every person" to be insufficient to abrogate state sovereign immunity); Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 245-46 (1985) (finding the phrase "any recipient of Federal assistance" to
be insufficient to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
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the one in the Bankruptcy Code would be insufficient, without further
definition, to abrogate state sovereign immunity.' 6' By analogy, the
phrase "other foreign or domestic government," standing alone, is also
insufficient to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.162 In Krystal Energy
Co., the Ninth Circuit found the language in the Bankruptcy Code
sufficient to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity under the assumption
that Congress could have abrogated tribal sovereign immunity by simply
stating that sovereign immunity is abrogated as to all parties. 163 Given
the holdings of Will and its progeny, however, it is clear that such a
broad statement would be insufficient to abrogate state sovereign
immunity. 64 Furthermore, because precedent concerning state sovereign
immunity is instructive in the tribal context, such a broad statement
would also be insufficient to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.165
When Congress chooses to subject states or Indian tribes to suit, it must
do so specifically. 166 Thus, the Bankruptcy Code does not abrogate the
sovereign immunity of Indian tribes because the general term "other
foreign or domestic government" does not indicate an unequivocal
expression of congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity.
167
161. See, e.g., Will, 491 U.S. at 64 (finding the phrase "every person" to be insufficient to
abrogate state sovereign immunity); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 245-46 (finding the phrase "any
recipient of Federal assistance" to be insufficient to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
162. See Osage Tribal Council, 187 F.3d at 1181-82 (citing precedent on state sovereign
immunity as support for determining whether language is sufficient to abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity).
163. Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1057.
164. See Will, 491 U.S. at 64; see also Woelffer v. Happy States of America, 626 F. Supp. 499,
504 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding that neither the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 501(a)-(b) (2000), which
authorizes suit against "anyone," nor the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000), which authorizes
suit against "any person," contained the kind of "unequivocal statutory language" sufficient to
abrogate state sovereign immunity).
165. See Osage Tribal Council, 187 F.3d at 1181-82 (citing the context of state sovereign
immunity as support for determining whether language is sufficient to abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity).
166. See Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 357 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that
Congress failed to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in the Copyright Act because the statute did
not specifically reference tribes or suits against tribes); Fla. Paraplegic Ass'n, Inc. v. Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126, 1132-33 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (holding that Congress failed to
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in the ADA because the statute does not specifically reference
tribes or suits against tribes). Cf Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246 (finding a state hospital immune from
suit because the Rehabilitation Act did not specifically authorize suits against states).
167. See also Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop Colony,
538 U.S. 701, 704 (2003) (finding that a statute utilizing a generic phrase, like "any person," does
not indicate an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign
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Moreover, the fact that the phrase "other foreign or domestic
government" logically seems to encompass Indian tribes does not suffice
to meet the unequivocal expression standard. 168 It is true that Indian
tribes have been referred to in case law as "domestic dependent
nations.' 169 Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the use of the term
"domestic government" in this instance is meant to include Indian
tribes. 170 While one may be able to conclude that Congress intended the
term "other foreign or domestic government" to encompass tribes, a
court could not say with "perfect confidence" that Congress intended
such a term to include tribes. 17' Even if a tribe is a domestic government,
a state-owned railroad is certainly a common carrier by railroad.
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court in Hilton seemingly conceded that
the encompassing term "common carrier by railroad" was an insufficient
indication of congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign
immunity.172 Thus, the fact that the phrase "other foreign or domestic
government" logically seems to encompass Indian tribes does not alone
demonstrate the requisite congressional intent.173  Therefore, the
Bankruptcy Code fails to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity even
though the general phrase "other foreign or domestic government" may
logically encompass Indian tribes.
Accordingly, §§ 106(a) and 101(27) of the Bankruptcy Code fail to
effectively abrogate the inherent sovereign immunity of Indian tribes.
The general phrase "other foreign or domestic government" in the
abrogation provisions is insufficient to indicate an unequivocal
expression of congressional intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of
tribes. Congress knows how to abrogate sovereign immunity when it so
immunity).
168. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230-32 (1989).
169. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
170. When statutes have defined a "governmental unit" or "governmental entity," Indian tribes
have often not been included in the definitions. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1997(a) (2000) (providing a
definition for the term "governmental entity" that does not include Indian tribes). But see 28 U.S.C.
§ 3701 (2000) (providing a definition for the term "governmental entity" that includes Indian
tribes).
171. See Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 231.
172. See Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 206-07 (1991) (holding nonetheless
that the phrase "every common carrier by railroad" abrogates state sovereign immunity under
principles of stare decisis).
173. Cf. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230-32 (1989) (finding a general phrase insufficient to subject
states to suit even if it logically seems to encompass states).
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chooses. 174 When abrogating tribal sovereign immunity in other statutes,
Congress has clearly indicated that the abrogation provisions apply
specifically to tribes. 175  To conclude now that Congress has
unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity
through a general phrase like "other foreign or domestic government"
would be to accept a standard for abrogation that has always been
deemed insufficient in the state context.176 To accept a lower standard of
explicitness in the face of contrary precedent, and to construe an
uncertainty in a statute against the benefit of Indians, would be to
reverse the federal deference that has always been granted to the
authority and sovereignty of Indian tribes.
177
VI. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code fails to effectively abrogate the inherent
sovereign immunity of Indian tribes. In drafting §§ 106(a) and 101(27)
of the Code, Congress did not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity
because the general phrase "other foreign or domestic government" does
not constitute an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to do
so. To find such an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, courts require tribes to be
specifically referenced in the statute. In the absence of such a specific
reference, general phrases like "other foreign or domestic government"
have been found insufficient to abrogate sovereign immunity. The mere
fact that the general phrase logically seems to encompass Indian tribes
174. In re Greene, 980 F.2d 590, 594 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that "Congress knows how to
limit the sovereign immunity of others when it wants to").
175. See, e.g., Osage Tribal Council v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 187 F.3d 1174, 1181-82 (10th Cir.
1999) (holding that the language of the Safe Drinking Water Act clearly abrogates tribal immunity
by defining a "person" subject to suit to include a "municipality," which in turn is defined to include
"an Indian tribe"); United States v. Weddell, 12 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1000 (D.S.D. 1998) (finding that
the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act unequivocally expresses the abrogation of tribal
sovereign immunity by defining a "person" subject to suit to include "an Indian tribe"); Blue Legs
v. EPA, 668 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (D.S.D. 1987) (holding that the definitions and provisions for
citizen suits under RCRA indicate congressional intent to subject tribes to suit).
176. See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (finding the phrase
"every person" to be insufficient to abrogate state sovereign immunity); Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 245-46 (1985) (finding the phrase "any recipient of Federal assistance" to
be insufficient to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
177. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) (stating that "statutes
are to be construed liberally in favor of Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their
benefit"); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Choate v. Trapp,
224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912).
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does not alone demonstrate the requisite congressional intent. To
conclude otherwise would be to accept a standard for abrogation that has
always been deemed insufficient in the past.
